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How impact fees and local planning regulation can influence 
deployment of telecoms infrastructure 
1  Introduction 
Electronic communications services have long been credited with weakening the links 
between geographic location and economic activity (Negroponte, 1995).  However, 
economic, political and physical geography can still have significant effects on the services 
themselves, because most telecoms offerings rely on physical network components that 
must be present in all geographic areas where the service is to be offered.  Mobile (cellular) 
telephone networks and wireless data networks require masts, antennae and base stations, 
often combined with fibre optic “backhaul” connections to carry bulk traffic around the 
network.   Fixed line and cable networks rely on physical infrastructure elements such as 
exchanges, trunk lines, street cabinets, ducts or poles and local lines to all connected 
premises.  They may also include some radio-based components such as the ones 
mentioned above.  
Investment in these physical elements and the civil works required to put them in place 
makes up a significant proportion of the costs of network deployment and hence the costs 
of the services delivered across them.  In this way, the sector is no different from other 
network utilities such as electricity, gas and water. 
However, electronic communications also differs in some important ways from other 
network sectors, and these characteristics can have a bearing on the deployment of physical 
infrastructure.  In developed countries, including Ireland (from which we draw the examples 
in this paper) telecoms service are more often provided by private firms than the network 
services in other utilities sectors, which are commonly provided through state owned 
organisations.  This has two important implications.  First, telecoms companies are likely to 
deploy infrastructure only where it is commercially attractive for them to do so or where 
they are compelled to do so (e.g. by universal service regulation).  Second, in Ireland 
telecoms firms face different regimes of planning scrutiny and infrastructure-related charges 
when developing, maintaining and deploying infrastructure than the other utilities.  Local 
authorities are permitted substantial discretion in setting local planning practices and fees, 
and in practice significant regional variations exist. 
This means that the charges, administrative burdens and time delays associated with 
obtaining planning consents for infrastructure development or maintenance vary by 
geographical area.  To a private telecoms company, these are costs, just like labour, poles or 
wires.   In principle, such firms may respond to these cost variations by favouring network 
development in some areas more than others. 
There are at least two reasons that such effects might concern policymakers.  First, if local 
regulation were applied inefficiently, this could distort or deter markets for electronic 
communications services.  That would make consumers worse off.  Indeed, not only 
consumers in the local authority areas where regulation was applied inefficiently would be 
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affected, but also consumers of two-way services in other areas wishing to communicate 
with those in affected areas. 
Second, such effects could make it more difficult to efficiently implement national and 
European information society policies.  Telecommunications policy has historically tried to 
maintain some degree of geographical universality in service provision, partly in response to 
the presence of network externalities and the perceived benefits to social and economic 
inclusion of maintaining broad connectivity.  In Europe, this objective was addressed using 
universal service measures for fixed line telephony and some other traditional services.  It 
persists as an aspiration in the case of more advanced services.  For example, A Digital 
Agenda for Europe (European Commission, 2010) sets the policy objectives in relation to 
broadband infrastructure at a European level. The key targets of this agenda are that all 
European citizens will have access to broadband internet with speeds of at least 30MB/s by 
2020 with 50% of users subscribing to broadband with speeds of over 100MB/s. The more 
short-term policy target is to have universal broadband provision by 2013. This paper 
focuses on the Republic of Ireland which at present has levels of broadband availability close 
to 99% (DCENR, 2010). The Irish government has also signalled a commitment to the rollout 
of a next generation broadband network (Department of the Taoiseach, 2011).  Inefficient 
local regulation could increase the cost of pursuing these policies. 
Nevertheless, there may be an economic rationale for maintaining some local planning 
scrutiny and fees on telecoms infrastructure development.  These technologies can create 
some negative externalities and government may have a role in addressing these.  One 
important principle of policy delivery is the subsidiarity principle, whereby policy is devolved 
to the most appropriate level.  There is a case for assigning some aspects of local planning 
policy to local authorities, since local conditions and preferences may vary in ways that a 
centralised mechanism would find it difficult to incorporate.  A further option is to allow 
local discretion within the bounds of a consistent set of national guidelines, so as to create 
more regulatory certainty and predictability.  The objective of policy should then be to 
ensure that local measures are economically efficient and that local authorities do not face 
perverse incentives when applying them.  
This paper uses data from Ireland to examine the economic appropriateness and practical 
effects of local government planning regulations on the provision of telecommunications 
infrastructure.  We consider both impact fees, which impose a direct cost on infrastructure 
developers, and more qualitative aspects of the planning process, which may impose 
indirect costs in the forms of administrative complexity, delays or unexpected rejections.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous research of relevance to this 
topic. Section 3 suggests a possible economic rationale for planning regulation of telecoms 
infrastructure and considers how optimal impact charges should relate to areas’ socio-
economic characteristics. In Section 4, we set out empirical findings as to whether current 
practices in Ireland seem economically appropriate and econometric results on the effects of 
one sort of impact charge (development contributions).  Finally, Section 5 concludes the 
paper.  
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2  Previous research on impact fees for telecoms infrastructure 
In this paper we are interested both in the institutional arrangements for scrutinising 
telecoms planning applications and in the fees that are charged by local regulators 
(sometimes termed “impact fees” or “development fees”).  To our knowledge, no studies 
have directly examined the effects of such planning parameters on the provision of new 
telecommunications infrastructure.  
However, the effects of planning regulations and impact fees on investment patterns have 
been examined in the context of the housing construction sector, where there is significant 
spatial regulatory heterogeneity.  In particular, researchers have examined their effects on 
house prices and the supply of new houses.  Brueckner (1997) examines the effect of impact 
fees in terms of a sustainable urban development financing model. He compares the 
practice of levying an impact fee up front to other long-term cost sharing approaches.  
Mayer and Somerville (2000) estimate a panel data model on data from US cities.  They find 
that local areas with more intrusive planning regulation (including both monetary and non-
monetary elements) can have up to 45% fewer housing starts as well significantly lower 
housing price elasticities.  They also conclude that the presence of impact fees has relatively 
little impact on new construction, but they find larger and more significant effects from 
regulations that lead to planning delays or restrict development in other ways.  However, it 
is worth noting that their model controls for the presence of impact fees but not their 
magnitude.  Burge & Ihlanfeldt (2006) find differing effects on housing construction from 
water and sewerage impact fees compared with fees for other public services, but both 
types have significant effects.  Ihlanfeldt (2007) confirms that the stringency of planning 
regulation can affect local housing markets, using an instrumental variables approach to take 
account of the possible endogeneity of the regulation index.  Burge and Ihlanfeldt (2009) 
examine the wider economic impact of different types of impact fees.  Using county level 
panel data from Florida, they find that impact fees affect local employment. 
In the Republic of Ireland, impact fees are called “development contributions”.  Clinch and 
O’Neill (2010) discuss the use of development contributions in Ireland, again focusing mainly 
on housing construction.  The Planning and Development Act of 2000 provided the 
legislative basis for the imposition of impact fees by local government in Ireland.  Section 48 
of the Act specifies that planning authorities may “require the payment of a contribution in 
respect of public infrastructure and facilities benefitting development in the area of the 
planning authority....”  Contributions may vary for “different classes or descriptions of 
development”, and the “...planning authority shall have regard to the actual estimated cost 
of providing the classes of public infrastructure and facilities...” when determining the level 
of contributions.  In this context, “public infrastructure and facilities” means 
(a)  the acquisition of land, 
(b)  the provision of open spaces, recreational and community facilities and amenities and 
landscaping works, 
5 
(c)  the provision of roads, car parks, car parking places, sewers, waste water and water 
treatment facilities, drains and watermains, 
(d)  the provision of bus corridors and lanes, bus interchange facilities (including car parks 
for those facilities), infrastructure to facilitate public transport, cycle and pedestrian 
facilities, and traffic calming measures, 
(e)  the refurbishment, upgrading, enlargement or replacement of roads, car parks, car 
parking places, sewers, waste water and water treatment facilities, drains or 
watermains, and 
(f)  any matters ancillary to paragraphs (a) to (e);1 
Section 48 has subsequently been amended by the Planning and Development 
(Amendment) Act 2010, with the definition of “public infrastructure and facilities” extended 
to include “the provision of high-capacity telecommunications infrastructure, such as 
broadband.”2 
We also note that recent European (and Irish) legislation allows for regulation of the co-
location and sharing of network elements and associated facilities.3  Depending upon how 
they are implemented, such measures may affect both the incentives for those rolling out 
infrastructure and the external costs of doing so in the future. 
In sum, development contributions for telecommunications infrastructure (or any other class 
of development) in Ireland are set by local authorities, who are supposed to set them with 
reference to the actual costs of providing public infrastructure.  The way the legislation has 
been applied, “actual costs” refers to the general expenditure by the local authority rather 
than specific costs associated with a given development.4   
The initial aim of introducing development charges in Ireland was to take account of certain 
external costs that rapid construction development was causing. These fees subsequently 
became a large fraction of local government financing (Department of Environment, 2008).   
Indeed, in 2006 they raised €671m (Burke, 2007).  Clinch and O’Neill (2010) discuss the 
rationale for development contributions with reference to the Irish situation. They advocate 
Pigouvian taxes on new construction and infrastructure development.  Pigouvian taxes are 
applied to goods or services that generate negative externalities and are set at a rate that 
aims to increase the private cost of the goods to match the full social cost.  In this way, such 
taxes aim to correct for the effect of externalities on market outcomes.  In the next section 
we take up this theme in the context of telecoms infrastructure. 
                                                            
1 Planning and Development Act, 2000, Section 48(17). 
2 Planning and Development (Amendment) Act 2010, Section 30(b)(ii). 
3
 E.g. for Ireland, Regulation 21 of the European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and 
Services) (Framework) Regulations 2011, S.I. No. 333 of 2011. 
4 The legal justification setting development contributions in this way was challenged in Construction Industry 
Federation v. Dublin City Council [2004] IEHC 37. However, the High Court concluded that Dublin City Council was 
acting in accordance with the legislation in its setting of these fees. 
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3  Economic rationale for local government planning regulation and impact fees for 
telecoms infrastructure 
The economic rationale for planning regulation and impact fees on mast and duct 
infrastructure stems from the negative local externalities that can arise from these 
investments.  Impact fees can be used as Pigouvian taxes to ensure that infrastructure 
developers face the full social costs of their networks.  Other instruments of planning 
regulation such as application, objection and appeals provisions serve their usual purpose of 
allowing local conditions and preferences to be taken account of within the framework of 
national policy guidance. 
Telecommunications masts can give rise to visual disamenity, reducing the welfare of those 
who live and work near them due to their appearance.  Some people are also concerned 
about putative health effects from telecommunications masts, which can give rise to 
opposition to their installation.  Using impact fees on installation of masts is an economically 
efficient option for ensuring that the network operator compensates society for generating 
these externalities and takes them into account when making investment decisions.  There 
are other approaches to addressing visual disamenity effects, such as choosing mast 
locations that minimise such effects.  Some attention is giving to such regulatory measures 
in the guidance given to Irish local authorities by central government, e.g. DELG (1996). 
Ducts used to carry fibre optic and copper cables can also give rise to negative externalities, 
mainly during the period they are being put in place.  Often these technologies are deployed 
in trenches under public roads and paths, and while they are being installed they normally 
restrict the use of these thoroughfares.  This temporarily reduces the public good services 
provided by the affected roads, reducing the welfare of users.  If the construction is not 
done properly, it may also damage the affected roads and paths, leading to longer term loss 
of welfare.  Here too, impact fees can help ensure the developer bears the wider societal 
costs.  Regulatory provisions can also help control the quality of remediation works. 
The optimal impact fees and regulatory provisions for both masts and ducts are likely to vary 
by area, because local conditions affect the scale and nature of the externalities generated.  
Local preferences and the backdrop against which visual disamenities are judged vary by 
locality.  Similarly, the intensity with which different roads are used and the cost involved in 
repairing their surfaces will affect the externalities that arise when they are blocked or dug 
up. 
The value of these externalities, and hence the optimal level of impact fees, is an empirical 
question.  The only valuation study of which we are aware for telecoms masts in Europe is 
Brandt and Maennig (2010).  In a study of Hamburg house purchases, they find no significant 
disamenity value for individual mobile base stations, but find that groups of base stations 
decrease property values by about 5.2% for properties within 100m.  There is somewhat 
more evidence from elsewhere in the world.  Higher disamenity values are found for new 
Zealand by Bond and Wang (2007), but Filippova and Rehm (2011), also for New Zealand 
(Auckland), find evidence of residential disamenities only for large “armed monopole” 
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masts.  Bond (2005) finds statistically significant but “minimal” effects for a sample of 
property transactions in Orange County, Florida. 
Anas and Lindsey (2011) review the literature on the use of road charges to manage such 
congestion externalities. They also discuss how such measures have been implemented in 
various cities across the world. There is a very limited literature on the direct cost of road 
closures attributable solely to infrastructure provision. However, Goodwin (2005) examines 
the role of utility providers in contributing to congestion in London. He finds that up to 25% 
of congestion is as a direct result of utility works and reports estimates that these utility 
works generate externalities between £1 billion and £4.3 billion per year. This is in line with 
a more recent study (Buchanan, 2010). However, both reports conclude that the exact figure 
is highly sensitive to the methodology used. Goodwin (2005) notes that much more 
congestion is caused by excessive traffic than by street works. This study also notes that 
there is a non-linear relationship between speed and traffic volumes. When the system is 
near capacity, small increases in traffic volumes or reduction in road capacity (e.g. utility 
works) have a much larger impact on the average speed of traffic. Thus, road closures should 
ideally be confined to times where the road network is not near capacity.  
For both types of infrastructure we conclude that the literature gives little guidance on the 
precise levels of externalities that should be expected in a given area.  However, there are 
useful lessons about likely relative levels of externalities across different types of areas. 
Setting impact fees on a Pigouvian basis involves estimating the value of externalities for all 
those affected by a given development and then charging this cost to the developer.  The 
nature of externalities generated by these investments provides guidance on how impact 
fees should vary across geographical areas with different characteristics.  In the case of 
masts, disamenities will tend to have the highest aggregate value in areas that are densely 
populated (lots of people live close to the mast), high property values (the discount due to 
the disamenity that is capitalised in house prices will be high), and perhaps high incomes 
(these are also correlated with house prices). 
Aggregate externalities from duct installation probably have more to do with the cost of 
remediating road surfaces damaged due to installation of ducts, the intensity of road usage 
and the extent of congestion prior to the development.  The timing and duration of the 
construction period will also have important effects on the total scale of the externality.  
Roads that bear traffic that places a high value on time would also have correspondingly 
high externality values. 
So far, we have focused in this section on the benefits of appropriate local regulation and 
fees.  It is also important to recognise that there may be substantial costs if these provisions 
are not set optimally.  The previous research discussed in the last section shows that 
planning regulation can have significant effects on housing investment. We postulate that 
for similar reasons, such regulation may affect the scale, location and timing of new 
telecommunications infrastructure investments.  To the extent that impact fees increase the 
cost of putting each mast or metre of underground duct in place, they will thereby reduce 
the expected lifetime profits arising from commercial use of the infrastructure.  The 
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expectation of lower profits in areas with high charges should deter network operators from 
deploying infrastructure there, relative to areas with low charges.  Thus the regional pattern 
of infrastructure deployment may be distorted, with likely consequences for the regional 
pattern of service availability or quality.  Furthermore, local taxes impose the same static 
welfare costs (deadweight loss) as national taxes do, so we would not wish impact fee rates 
to be any higher than necessary.  Indeed, impact fees applied to innovative infrastructure 
are likely to have additional negative effects on societal welfare, as potential consumer 
surplus from future adopters of the relevant services are deterred or prevented from using 
them (Goolsbee, 2006).  This has obvious relevance to next generation broadband services. 
Moreover, non-monetary features of the planning system may affect the attractiveness of 
deploying infrastructure in a given area.  Longer expected delays in obtaining planning 
permission or greater uncertainty about the likelihood of a successful application should 
have effects similar in kind to impact fees, and they too may vary by local authority. 
In the remainder of this paper we use data from Ireland to examine whether the planning 
rules and impact fees seem to be set in an economically efficient manner and whether fees 
seem to have a material effect on infrastructure development. 
4   Empirical analysis 
In this section we consider the evidence on whether the pattern of impact fees and planning 
regulation practices applied by Irish local authorities to telecommunications infrastructure 
developments is consistent with the economic principles set out above.  In the first two sub-
sections we focus on development contributions and road opening charges.  The final part of 
the section discusses other, more qualitative, characteristics of planning regulation and how 
these may affect investment in telecommunications infrastructure. 
4.1.1 Regional pattern of development contributions for telecommunications masts 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between population density (on the left axis, with a log 
scale) and development contributions for telecommunications masts (on the right axis).  We 
had hypothesised that this relationship should be positive, because the external costs 
imposed by masts are likely to be positively correlated with population density. 
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Figure 1: Population density in 2006 and development contribution rates in 2006 and 2010 
 
Sources: TIF and local authority websites for development contribution rates and CSO (2011a) for 
other data. 
 
The actual relationship appears to be negative, with the highest density local authorities 
setting low or zero charges and the high charges being applied by some local authorities that 
have quite low population densities. Also, if anything this pattern seems to have 
strengthened over time.  Many of these charges are updated according to the building 
component of the Consumer Price Index. Thus, they increased over the 2006-2008 period. 
However, they do not seem to have fallen in line with recent deflationary pressures. 
Why might this pattern have arisen?  Modelling the political economy of local authority fees 
is outside the scope of this paper, but we can suggest some possible reasons for the 
observed pattern.  The development contribution for this type of infrastructure is only one 
among many sources of income over which local authorities have more or less discretion.  
There are presently no domestic property taxes in Ireland, but other development charges, 
business rates, fees for a variety of services and block grants from central government 
combine to generate the total income of each local authority.  It may be that urban 
authorities tend to choose a different mix of charges from rural ones because they have a 
broader tax and fee base to work with.  Alternatively, rural local authorities may have 
different preferences as to the desirability of certain types of infrastructure than urban ones. 
However, neither of these explanations sits easily with another feature evident in this figure: 
there is substantial variation in the charges applied by local authorities with similar 
demographic characteristics.  For example, Kilkenny, Monaghan and Westmeath have 
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similar population density, but Monaghan applies development contributions several times 
higher than the others.  Indeed, the 2011 rates for Monaghan and Carrickmacross Town 
Councils were over €50,000 per mast and €20,000 per antenna (Monaghan Local Authorities, 
2011). 
We can carry out the same exercise using per capita income, with similar results.  Figure 2 
shows the relationship between average per capita disposable income by local authority and 
levels of development contributions for telecommunications masts.  The most recent 
regional income data available is for 2008, so the comparison is for that year, and we have 
sorted local authorities in order of increasing income. 
 
Figure 2: Development contribution rates and average disposable income per capita in 
2008 
 
Sources: TIF and local authority websites for development contribution rates and CSO (2011b) for 
county average disposable incomes.  Note: where there are more than one local authority in a county 
(Dublin, Waterford, Cork, Limerick and Galway), we have attributed the county average income to all 
component areas. 
 
Average income varies much less across counties than population density does, but the 
overall relationship with development contributions is similar.  The local authorities with the 
highest income residents tend to apply low or zero contributions, while most authorities 
with high contribution levels tend to be in the lower half of areas by income. 
This is the opposite of the pattern we expected to see, since higher household incomes are 
likely to be correlated with greater demand for telecommunications services and higher 
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external costs (e.g. via property prices).  This comparison also exhibits the substantial 
variation mentioned earlier in the levels of charges applied by areas that seem otherwise 
similar (indeed, Monaghan and Westmeath are again similar when compared by income 
level but have very dissimilar charges). 
In the case of telecommunications masts, the pattern of local authority development 
contributions does not seem consistent with economic principles.  In particular, charges vary 
much more than economic and demographic conditions can explain and levels of charges 
show the opposite association to what economic reasoning indicated should be efficient. 
4.1.2  Association between development contributions and telecommunications 
mast deployment 
A question remains as to whether these regional variations in policy are sufficiently large to 
have measurable effects on the behaviour of network operators.  In the case of masts it is 
possible to test whether this is so.  In the remainder of this sub-section we estimate a simple 
model of the number of telecommunications masts in each Irish local authority area in 2011, 
taking into account factors that should affect deployment of masts, including the 
development contribution in each area.  Our interest is in discovering whether the 
development contribution has a significant effect on the number of masts deployed after 
controlling for other influences on mast deployment. 
We assume that an operator’s decision about how many masts to deploy in a given county 
depends upon the population, the geographical size of the county, the per capita income of 
those in the county and the cost of deployment.  All other things equal, a higher population 
should require more masts because there are limits to the number of subscribers a mast can 
serve at one time,5 geographical extent should be positively associated with the number of 
masts because cellular technology imposes limits on the physical zone that may be covered 
from one point, and higher disposable income should require more masts because income is 
positively associated with the intensity of use of mobile telephony and broadband services.  
Higher costs of deploying masts should be negatively associated with the number of masts 
deployed, since we assume that mobile telephony network operators have the objective of 
maximising profits. 
The model is summarised in Equation 1, which describes the number of masts M in the area 
covered by local authority i: 
1 2 3 4i i i i iM f D P A Y      (1) 
where α is a constant, D is the development contribution per mast in Euro, P is the 
population, A is the size of the geographical area in Km2, Y is disposable income per capita 
and ε is a random error term.   
                                                            
5 The number of antennae on the mast and the nature of the services it is used to deliver also affect the number 
of subscribers it can serve, but these characteristics are not included in the available data. 
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We use a negative binomial count regression estimator, which is useful for applications in 
which the dependent variable has a lower bound of zero and is often used to model 
processes involving numbers of items or events.6  The commonly used ordinary least squares 
estimator is not appropriate for limited dependent variables such as this.  We also test 
whether the more restricted Poisson estimator would be an adequate alternative, but the 
data reject this restriction. 
Table 1 below summarises the data we use for this model, and the data are set out in Annex 
1.  Since local regulatory policy and impact charges are set at the local authority level, we 
focus on the 34 counties and urban boroughs in Ireland.  Information on the number of 
telecommunications masts in each authority is available for 2011 only.  These data were 
obtained from Siteviewer, a website maintained by the regulator that displays digital maps 
of current mast locations.7 The data relate to the number of masts on May 5th 2011.  GIS 
analysis (using ArcGIS10) was carried out to map the data on mast location to specific local 
authority areas. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics (34 observations of counties/urban boroughs) 
Variable description Variable name Mean Std Dev Min. Max. 
Telecoms masts in 
2011 
Number of masts 191 156 50 870 
Development 
contribution rate 
per mast in 2008 (€) 
Development contribution 7,220 7,440 0 30,000 
Population in 2008 Population 137,000 109,000 32,101 594,00
0 
Geographical area of 
country/urban 
borough (Km2) 
County area 2,050 1,810 20.4 7,430 
Average disposable 
income in 2008 (€) 
Disposable income per 
capita 
21,900 1,620 18,600 25,300 
 
Data on development contributions in each local authority was provided by the Irish 
Telecommunications and Internet Federation (TIF), with some additions made by the 
authors based on local authority publications.  Data on population and geographical area 
were obtained from the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO, 2011a) and data on average 
disposable income per capita in each local authority area comes from CSO (2011b). 
All variables apart from the number of masts relate to the year 2008, so there is about a 
three year lag between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable.  This is in part 
                                                            
6 Wooldridge (2002). 
7 http://www.askcomreg.ie/mobile/siteviewer.273.LE.asp  
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unavoidable, because the most recent published data on average disposable income at 
county level is for 2008.  However, it does seem appropriate to impose some form of lag in 
this model.  Masts tend to be relatively persistent, since the networks that use them wish to 
maintain coverage in the areas they serve.  This suggests that the stock of masts should 
change slowly in response to changes in socioeconomic or cost conditions.  To see if the 
model is sensitive to the length of lag employed, we tested a lag of five years (using 2006 
data).  This made very little difference to the results.   
Marginal effects from the regression are set out in Table 2 below, and the regression 
coefficients are detailed in Annex 2.  All the explanatory variables are significant at the 5% 
level or better.  The development contribution variable has the expected negative sign, 
suggesting that mast deployment is deterred by higher levels of this charge.  The marginal 
effect shown here implies that an increase in the development contribution of €10,000 is 
associated with about 23 fewer masts in a county than would be expected if it had average 
characteristics in other respects (or each increase of €442 is associated with one fewer 
mast).  To put this in perspective, the average development contribution in the sample (from 
Table 1) was €7,220 and the highest value in the sample was €30,000. 
Table 2: Telecommunications masts per county, negative binomial 
regression model, marginal effects evaluated at sample means 
Dependent variable: Number of masts 
Explanatory  variables and statistics Marginal 
effect Standard error 
Development contribution -0.00226 0.00088** 
Population  0.000583 0.00008*** 
County area 0.0149 0.00393*** 
Disposable income per capita 0.0124 0.00559** 
Observations 34 
Pseudo R2 0.200 
Log likelihood -164 
LR test of restriction to Poisson model χ 2(1)=89.7  [0.000] 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.  We check for 
heteroscedasticity using the Breusch–Pagan-Cook–Weisberg test. 
 
Population, geographical area and disposable income all had positive effects as expected.  
Ceteris paribus, an extra mast is associated with about 1,700 additional population, 67 Km2 
greater geographical area or €81 higher disposable income per capita. 
These results suggest that there is a significant negative association between development 
contribution levels and mast deployment by network operators.  The estimated intensity of 
the effect should be treated with caution, because this analysis is based on limited data.  
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Variables that we do not observe, such as county topography, may affect the number of 
masts deployed.  If such omitted variables were strongly correlated with development 
contributions this could distort our results.  Another issue is that the results depend strongly 
upon the assumed functional form of the model.  We tested the model with OLS and a log 
transformed dependent variable, which yielded the same signs on coefficients as the count 
model shown above, and OLS in levels, in which only the population coefficient was 
significant.  Nevertheless, the direction and broad scale of the effect seems consistent with 
the theoretical expectation that imposing higher development contributions could be a 
significant deterrent to investment in local network infrastructure. 
4.2  Road opening charges 
Much local telecommunications infrastructure is installed below ground and thus 
construction of new and maintenance of existing infrastructure requires permission to dig 
up roads. This requires a road opening licence, which is obtained though an application to 
the appropriate local authority. Permission to open national roads now lies with the National 
Roads Authority (NRA). If permission is granted, a road opening charge is then levied.  
We expect to see some geographical differences in the levels of fees charged, with higher 
fees in dense urban areas than in rural areas.  This does seem to happen in at least some 
cases.  However, the structure of charges applied by individual councils also varies widely 
and not always with an obvious economic rationale. For example, some local authorities 
apply a minimum fee and others do not.  Variables like the required maintenance period, the 
requirement to post a refundable bond and different charges by type of road surface are 
applied very differently across the country.  For a network operator wishing to deploy 
infrastructure nationwide, this diversity increases the costs of compliance.   
A further source of variation in investment costs across local authorities arises from planning 
processes governing roadworks.  For example, we understand that there are differences in 
the “taking in charge” processes across authority areas, and different methods are employed 
for funding “diversionary works”, i.e. moving and modifying external plant for road 
upgrades, widening etc. 
While there seems to be a reasonable economic case for variations in the level of charges 
applied in different areas and to different sorts of road surfaces, it is less clear that the costs 
of applying widely varying structures of charges are justified by offsetting benefits. 
We also note that road opening charges in Ireland take the form of up-front fees.  This 
charging mechanism has the benefit of simplicity, but it provides no incentive for timely 
completion of the roadworks.  Since the externalities associated with road opening are likely 
to be at least partly proportional to the duration that the road is unavailable for use, such an 
incentive would be desirable.  One option for doing this would be to apply lane rental 
charges rather than one-off fees (see e.g. Buchanan, 2010). 
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4.3  Other characteristics of local planning regimes 
One curious aspect of planning regulations for telecommunications masts in Ireland is that 
the permissions given are time limited.  Every five years network operators must reapply for 
planning permission (and in some cases pay a development contribution, albeit often at a 
lower rate than for de novo applications).  This provision adds to the administrative costs 
and uncertainty involved developing mast infrastructure.  The economic rationale for such a 
time limitation is not clear.  Telecommunications infrastructure probably has a higher 
economic depreciation rate than many other types of physical infrastructure (because of 
rapid technical progress), and thus particular facilities are likely to be replaced or removed 
sooner.  However, this is no reason to require network operators to resubmit applications at 
a fixed interval.  Such a constraint may increase the likelihood of removal for some 
economically marginal masts, but it increases the cost of maintaining the entire stock of 
masts. 
In Ireland, the planning system is a two-stage process. First, each applicant sends their 
proposal to the relevant local authority. This local authority then makes a decision regarding 
the application.  Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of planning application outcomes for all 
planning decisions regarding telecommunications masts in Ireland during the period 2002-
2010. There is some variation across counties apparent in the data. However, there is a 
certain degree of planning consistency when the main outliers (Kerry and Waterford City) 
are removed. It must also be noted that the number of planning applications in each local 
authority varies significantly. This is of course partly reflective of population. 
Figure 3: Shares of planning decisions for telecommunications masts by type (2002-2010)  
 
Sources: Various Local Authority websites 
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There may be some justification across local regulators for heterogeneity in the pattern of 
planning application outcomes. Local factors like topography or preserved land areas may 
help explain this. There may also be aesthetic or attitudinal differences across areas that 
affect the frequency of objections or the likelihood of a successful application.   
Of course, network operators are not unaware of how past applications performed in the 
planning system.  One would expect that counties where many applications were rejected in 
one period might have fewer applications and lower rejection rates in subsequent periods, 
as operators reduce or adjust their patterns of applications to avoid likely rejections.  There 
is indeed some evidence that this might have happened in Ireland.  For example, after only 
10% of mast applications were granted permission in Kerry in the 2001-6 period, 34% were 
accepted in 2007-10 (see Annex 3).  Of course, other areas saw reductions in acceptance 
rates over time, so other mechanisms may also be at work. 
At the second stage of the planning process, if the initial application is refused or an 
objection is lodged against it, the applicant has the option of appealing the decision to An 
Bord Pleanála, which is a state planning body that can confirm, modify or overturn the 
decision made at local level. When a planning application is granted at local authority level, 
there is a waiting period of four weeks. This allows any person to lodge an objection to the 
development. This, in turn, may lead the planning application to be reviewed by An Bord 
Pleanála. This process can create significant delays as summarised in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Effect of appeals on planning process duration for 
telecoms mast applications (in days, 2002-2010) 
Average planning case duration 91  
Average Planning case duration with appeal 217  
Sources: Various Local Authority websites and An Bord Pleanála 
 
Table 4 summarises outcome shares for An Bord Pleanála decisions regarding 
telecommunications masts. As shown in Table 3, there is a significant time delay associated 
with an appeal process. 61 percent of appeals that were initially refused at local authority 
level were subsequently overturned by An Bord Pleanála. Almost 90 percent of appeals for 
applications that were initially granted at local authority level are upheld by An Bord 
Pleanála. These types of appeals arise when a third party objects to the infrastructure 
development or when a private operator appeals against the number of conditions 
associated with the initial grant of permission. 
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Table 4: Refusal rates on planning appeal decisions for 
telecommunications mast applications (2002-2010) 
Local 
Authority 
Decision 
An Bord Pleanála Decision 
Grant Refuse 
Grant 89% 11% 
Refuse 61% 39% 
Total number of appeals: 533 
Source: An Bord Pleanála 
 
In sum, we see little reason that planning permissions for mobile masts should be time 
limited, and although we could not quantify the costs arising from planning delays or 
unexpected refusals, the wide variation in outcomes across the country suggest that there 
may be scope for reducing the costs of infrastructure development by further harmonisation 
of development practices.   
5  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have discussed the rationale for local government regulation. We conclude 
that there are valid reasons for having such regulation and that there are likely to be local 
differences in the appropriate level of regulation.  The cost of disruption will not be uniform 
across the country and thus different levels of road opening charges are likely to be justified. 
Disruption costs should tend to increase with population density and urbanisation, as well as 
the value of time for those affected, which in turn may be correlated with incomes, local 
sector of employment, employment status and other socio-economic characteristics.  
Telecommunications masts may have some disamenity value. Again, this may vary by area 
so variations in regulation, and in particular development contributions, may be appropriate.  
Disamenity value is likely to be correlated with population density, property values and 
income levels, but may also be associated with topology, attitudinal factors and the 
presence of other local amenities (e.g. nice views) or the prevailing types of structures in the 
area. 
Comparing the pattern of development contributions applied by different local authorities, 
we find that areas with lower population density and lower average disposable income tend 
to apply higher development charges for telecommunications masts.  This pattern does not 
seem consistent with the economic rationale for these charges.  The variations in 
contribution levels overall and particularly between otherwise similar local authority areas 
seems excessive.  It is also notable that the high levels of charges applied by many local 
authorities seem hard to justify given that most international evidence on mast externalities 
indicates that these costs are small or even undetectable.  As yet, there has been no 
published research on the scale of these effects in Ireland. 
We developed a simple econometric model of the number of masts at local authority level 
to see whether there is evidence that development contribution rates have a material 
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impact on mast deployment in Ireland.  It seems they do.  Although our model is based on a 
small number of cross-sectional observations, the development contributions variable is 
significant both statistically and in economic terms.  A hypothetical increase in the 
development contribution of €10,000 is associated with about 23 fewer masts in a county 
than would be expected if it had average characteristics in other respects (or each increase 
of €442 is associated with one fewer mast).  This suggests that setting appropriate rates of 
development contributions could help avoid significant distortions in the deployment of 
future mast infrastructure. 
We briefly discussed the structure of road opening charges, and we noted significant 
variation in the amount and the structure of the charges applied. These charges should 
reflect variations in costs of road remediation and levels of congestion that exist across the 
country. However, there may be scope for improvement in their application. Additional 
transparency on the criteria that road authorities should apply, a central source for 
information on fees and other conditions, and perhaps some degree of harmonisation of the 
charging structure that is applied would be desirable improvements.  For example, we 
understand that a more unified approach is employed in the United Kingdom, governed by 
the New Roads and Streets Work Act, 1991.  In addition, the incentive properties of road 
opening charges could be improved by taking into account the time dimension of 
development, for example by switching from fixed up-front charges to lane rental charges.  
There may be scope for future empirical research in this area, as data exist on both 
determinants and outcomes of local fixed line infrastructure deployment. 
We also discussed the planning process for telecommunication masts. Again, this process is 
largely undertaken at local authority level. Although, we found evidence of variation across 
jurisdictions, we were unable to quantify the direct impact of this on the costs of developing 
telecommunication masts. However, it is evident that planning delays and uncertainty about 
outcomes imposes significant non-monetary costs on private operators.  Some of this is 
unavoidable, because it would be impractical to have a system entirely without delays or 
uncertainty.  However, the level of variation in the distribution of outcomes across local 
authorities is surprisingly high, so there may be some benefit in further harmonisation of 
practices through central guidance.   
Previous research shows that most telecommunications networks are subject to economies 
of density.  This effect is more important for fixed than for mobile networks, and particularly 
so for fibre and coaxial cable networks.  If local regulatory measures were to amplify this 
effect by unnecessarily inflating the cost for developments in rural areas relative to dense 
urban areas, that should be a concern for policymakers.  Absent reform, such distortions 
would either reinforce the tendency towards an urban/rural digital divide or make it more 
costly for the government to prevent such a divide. 
Ireland’s current economic difficulties may add an extra dimension to this potential problem.  
In 2008, the Telecommunications and Internet Federation (TIF) estimated that €700m was 
being invested in telecoms infrastructure (DCENR, 2009). The fiscal crisis and credit crunch 
have tended to depress investment in many sectors of the economy.  For this reason, the 
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elasticity of investment with respect to regulatory costs may have increased since the data 
for our study was collected. Costs of all kinds may loom larger at times when expected 
demand growth is low and investment constraints are tight. 
Most households in Ireland now have access to basic broadband, and mobile coverage is 
extensive.  However, in the medium term, continued technological progress is likely to offer 
new opportunities for telecoms infrastructure deployment and enhancement.  For example, 
if Long Term Evolution (LTE) mobile technology is deployed in low population density areas, 
upgrading of the mast infrastructure will be required. Similarly, the rollout of fibre-based 
next generation broadband network in urban areas would require a lot of construction 
under roads and paths.  
This paper examined current regulations affecting telecommunications infrastructure.  The 
current pattern of development contributions charged by local authorities does not seem 
consistent with the economic rationale for these charges.  It might also be more efficient if 
road opening charges and some qualitative aspects of local planning regimes as applied to 
telecoms infrastructure exhibited less variation and complexity across local authorities. 
These issues may become still more pertinent as network operators seek to deploy high 
bandwidth data services across an ever larger footprint.  The spatial distribution of such 
investments will obviously be largely driven by population density, but reform of local 
planning regulations might help avoid an unnecessary amplification of the urban-rural 
rollout divide. 
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Annex 1 – Data used to model the number of telecommunications masts in Ireland 
County/urban 
borough 
Masts 
in 
2011 
Development 
contribution 
per mast in 
2008 (€) 
Population 
in 2008 
Geographica
l area (Km2) 
Avg. disposable 
income per 
capita (€) 
Carlow 69 10,658.34        55,820                  898                 21,450  
Cavan 114 10,570.00        70,857               1,898                 21,241  
Clare 197 6,391.00     121,576               3,387                 21,428  
Cork City 210 0.00     161,893                     40                 22,340  
Cork County 550 0.00     369,948               7,431                 22,340  
Donegal 188 0.00     161,913               4,856                 18,596  
Dublin City 870 0.00     594,263                  118                 25,337  
Dun Laoghaire 262 0.00     233,162                  127                 25,337  
Fingal 349 0.00     205,230                  453                 25,337  
Galway City 139 0.00        76,551                     67                 21,680  
Galway County 263 10,000.00     175,906               6,061                 21,680  
Kerry 220 14,000.00     151,109               4,735                 19,899  
Kildare 266 0.00     206,269               1,648                 23,342  
Kilkenny 150 10,000.00        96,870               2,072                 21,462  
Laois 109 15,000.00        74,021               1,688                 21,030  
Leitrim 50 18,835.00        32,101               1,531                 20,902  
Limerick City 87 5,570.00        63,408                     20                 22,769  
Limerick County 195 2,188.00     138,434               2,740                 22,769  
Longford 54 12,100.00        38,362               1,069                 20,123  
Louth 155 5,818.00     123,594                  823                 22,007  
Mayo 176 6,699.00     135,898               5,425                 20,223  
Meath 264 0.00     180,558               2,305                 22,806  
Monaghan 97 30,000.00        62,183               1,296                 20,506  
Offaly 98 20,600.00        78,543               1,990                 19,704  
Roscommon 105 12,130.00        65,146               2,548                 20,263  
Sligo 86 8,800.00        66,912               1,837                 21,798  
South Dublin 297 0.00     268,966                  223                 25,337  
Tipperary North 118 7,580.58        72,105               1,994                 21,721  
Tipperary South 115 18,899.74        93,445               2,258                 21,905  
Waterford City 71 2,507.00        53,491                     72                 22,197  
Waterford County 94 10,000.00        65,377               1,787                 22,197  
23 
Westmeath 135 3,600.00        87,622               1,825                 20,718  
Wexford 179 3,500.00     146,078               2,365                 21,543  
Wicklow 193 0.00     139,363               2,033                 21,893  
Note: Urban boroughs have been assigned the same average income as the county in which they are 
located. 
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Annex 2 – Regression coefficients 
 
Table A2.1: Telecommunications masts per county, negative binomial 
count model, regression coefficients and standard errors 
Dependent variable: Number of masts 
Explanatory  variables and 
statistics Coef. Standard error 
Development contribution -0.0000142 0.00000555*** 
Population  0.00000366 0.000000468*** 
County area 0.0000936 0.0000246*** 
Disposable income per 
capita 
0.0000781 0.0000351** 
Constant 2.77 0.778*** 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively.  Numbers in brackets are p-values.  We check 
for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch–Pagan-Cook–Weisberg 
test. 
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Annex 3 – Summary of planning data  
2001-2006      2007-2010 
 
Note: Often, these numbers are based on small sample sizes. They are only used for illustrative 
purposes. 
 
 
 
% Granted % Refused %Incomplete/Withdrawn County % Granted % Refused %Incomplete/Withdrawn
0.75 0.00 0.25 CARLOW 0.33 0.22 0.44
0.86 0.05 0.10 CAVAN 1.00 0.00 0.00
0.79 0.05 0.15 CLARE 0.47 0.06 0.47
0.44 0.40 0.16 CORK CITY 0.44 0.28 0.28
0.52 0.07 0.40 CORK COUNTY 0.59 0.03 0.38
0.62 0.09 0.29 DONEGAL 0.31 0.43 0.26
0.51 0.14 0.35 FINGAL 0.00 0.00 1.00
0.62 0.10 0.29 GALWAY CITY 0.41 0.10 0.49
0.77 0.15 0.08 GALWAY COUNTY 0.75 0.03 0.23
0.10 0.72 0.18 KERRY 0.34 0.21 0.45
0.51 0.06 0.43 KILDARE 0.43 0.07 0.50
0.74 0.23 0.03 KILKENNY 0.89 0.06 0.06
0.76 0.10 0.14 LAOIS 0.75 0.06 0.19
0.57 0.12 0.31 LEITRIM 0.57 0.10 0.33
0.72 0.04 0.24 LIMERICK CITY 0.23 0.33 0.43
0.58 0.04 0.38 LIMERICK COUNTY 0.44 0.10 0.46
0.95 0.05 0.00 LONGFORD 0.88 0.10 0.02
0.86 0.03 0.11 LOUTH 0.58 0.05 0.37
0.82 0.03 0.15 MAYO 0.70 0.11 0.19
0.70 0.03 0.28 MEATH 0.76 0.13 0.11
0.67 0.18 0.15 MONAGHAN 0.60 0.25 0.15
0.72 0.08 0.20 OFFALY 0.48 0.11 0.41
0.57 0.05 0.38 ROSCOMMON 0.81 0.10 0.10
0.72 0.17 0.11 SLIGO 0.64 0.32 0.05
0.57 0.25 0.18 SOUTH DUBLIN 0.44 0.26 0.30
0.74 0.07 0.20 TIPPERARY NORTH 0.76 0.07 0.17
0.56 0.07 0.37 TIPPERARY SOUTH 0.28 0.12 0.60
0.27 0.27 0.47 WATERFORD CITY 0.25 0.25 0.50
0.64 0.07 0.29 WATERFORD COUNTY 0.57 0.14 0.29
0.70 0.22 0.08 WESTMEATH 0.56 0.11 0.33
0.91 0.05 0.05 WEXFORD 0.89 0.11 0.00
0.56 0.18 0.26 WICKLOW 0.73 0.14 0.14
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